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21. Introduction
For Ireland the experience of independence in the 20th century has been eventful. Its post-
independence relationship with its former imperial power – the United Kingdom – was
initially not always comfortable, but it was certainly a much easier relationship than that of
many other countries, such as Finland and Estonia, which got their independence around the
same time. For Ireland, membership of the European Union was the final corner-stone on its
economic independence, providing a legal framework within which it has equal rights (and
responsibilities) to the United Kingdom and all of our other European neighbours. For all
small nations within the EU the benefits of such a legal regime, protecting their rights, has
proved important, and it helps explain why Finland and Ireland have approached EU
membership with somewhat greater enthusiasm than the United Kingdom or Sweden.
When a major history of Ireland in the 20th century was first published a decade ago (Lee,
1989) one of the many interesting questions addressed was why Ireland was an economic
failure. Now the question posed by outsiders looking at Ireland is why is it such a success?
To those living through the experience there is a certain sense of bemusement at this rapid
reversal of fortunes. However, it is now becoming clear that, whatever the causes, the Irish
economy is truly undergoing something of a renaissance. This paper argues that it is not a
temporary phenomenon, but rather represents the fruits of a strategy that has been pursued for
a number of decades with considerable consistency by successive Irish governments. The
result may be no “tiger” but nor is it a tame pussycat.
In the 1980s Lee was writing against the backdrop of an economy undergoing a severe
recession and to some extent this may have coloured his writing. This highlights the danger
for social scientists of being unduly influenced by current events and it is something we must
keep in mind in looking at the future from the vantage point of to day. Even more than
historians, economic forecasters have an inbuilt tendency to see tomorrow as being the same
as to day. The pessimism about the Irish economy which prevailed in Ireland until very
recently highlights the poor self-image that persisted throughout the post-war years,
influencing economists, historians and politicians alike. Even if Ireland were truly a tiger its
citizens would be the last to see it.
Economics alone is not sufficient to explain the process of economic development. The
cultural and social environment in which an economy is set plays such a vital role in
determining the relative success or failure of economic policy that to ignore the background
is to miss the picture itself. In the case of Ireland, its economic successes and failures since
3independence have been chronicled and reflected in the social and cultural development of
the last 75 years. This paper focuses first on a number of underlying social, economic, and
political factors which have contributed to Ireland’s economic coming of age. It then
examines Ireland’s recent economic record and the economic mechanisms which explain the
current rapid convergence in Irish living standards to the EU average. The final Section
discusses some of the problems and challenges which the new, more successful, Ireland faces
over the next decade.
2. Coming of Age
The Ireland of to-day has, in a sense, come of age, a process which is always difficult, and
there may be some in the country who still hark back to the earlier days of the state in a
protected environment. However, for most adults living in Ireland to-day their life time has
seen profound changes in a number of different spheres:
• Central to the Irish consciousness over two centuries has been the continuing
phenomenon of emigration.
• More recently membership of the European Union has played a vital role in the coming
of age process.
• In terms of domestic policy, the failure to develop the education system in the first 50
years of independence after 1922 was probably the new nation’s most glaring mistake
and the accelerated investment in education in the last 25 years is one of the country’s
major successes. The changing educational attainment of the population is having a very
wide impact on Irish society, not least on the pattern of demographic change.
It is this last feature, the demographic structure of Ireland, which still sets it apart from many
of its EU neighbours.
2.1. Emigration
Central to the Irish experience has been the history of emigration. Going back to the 18th
century, the tradition of emigration has been a continuing feature of the lives of all of the
population, rich and poor, young and old. It had a particularly important impact on the
economy in the 19th century (O’Rourke and Williamson, 1995) and the despair and the
tragedy which it symbolised is still deeply ingrained. However, it is the gradual change in the
nature of that experience which is both a symptom and a cause of the new Ireland.
4Up to the 1950s the “American wake”1 was a central feature of Irish life; the family mourned
the emigration of one of their children who would probably never be seen again. However,
even by the 1950s, the nature of the grief expressed at the “wake” was changing as the
emigrants went to England and Scotland. Even if they would never live in Ireland, they would
certainly be seen again on occasional holidays. The attitude of the emigrants was also
changing. The contrast in the 1950s between the burgeoning economies of the UK, Germany
and France and the economic depression of an Ireland where they could not find jobs, left
them bewildered and angry. This attitude is reflected in the literary writings of Edna O’Brien
and Brendan Behan who were part of the exodus to the UK in the post-war years.
However, there was a gradual change in circumstances from the end of the 1950s which has
greatly changed the current experience of emigration. This change is symbolised by former
President Robinson’s gesture, the day she took office, of lighting a candle in the window of
her house - it served to welcome the returning emigrant as well as recognising the importance
of the diaspora. (This candle remained lighting throughout her term of office.) To-day
emigration is still part of the experience of up to a quarter of each generation (and of every
family) but the difference is that the emigrants of to-day are seen more as homing pigeons.
The “best and the brightest” may still emigrate but the expectation and the experience
suggests that the bulk of them will return.
In the post-war years the single most important factor driving emigration has been the
difference between unemployment rates in Ireland and other labour markets to which Irish
people have had access, most notably the UK. Set out below in Figures 1 and 2 is an analysis
of net emigration classified by the educational attainment of the emigrants. They show a
fairly similar pattern in the late 1980s to the late 1960s in terms of the proportion of the
cohort of 15 to 29 year olds emigrating. However, the second half of the 1980s saw a big
change in the educational attainment of the emigrants. Around a third of the emigrants had a
third level education in the late 1980s compared to under 20% in the 1960s, and in the late
1980s there was very little emigration by people with only a primary education whereas they
accounted for the bulk of emigrants in the 1960s. This latter change reflects the fact that the
Irish welfare system, which was almost non-existent in 1960, grew to be more generous than
that of the UK by the late 1980s.
Figure 1 Figure 2
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Looking to the future there must be some doubt about the stability of the relationship which
held in the past where the Irish unemployment rate was about 4 percentage points above the
UK rate in equilibrium (Kearney, 1998). Figure 3 compares Irish and UK unemployment
rates for 1994 by educational attainment. It shows that for those with at least a leaving
certificate (roughly equivalent to the French bac., taken at age 17 or 18 on leaving the second
level system) the gap in unemployment rates in 1994 was less than 4 percentage points and
unemployment rates were lower in Ireland for graduates. With the proportion of the
population who have reached at least leaving certificate standard of education continuing to
rise, the result may be a reduction in the potential gap between unemployment rates in Ireland
and the UK.
While those with a good education are now more likely to emigrate than those with only a
primary education, they are also more likely to come back. As shown in Figure 4, in 1991
over a quarter of all those in the country (males and females) with a third level education had
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6lived abroad for at least a year. For all other educational categories the proportion was 10 or
15%. While the latter figure is exceptionally high by the standards of other EU countries, it
still suggests a much lower return rate than for those with third level education. It means that
even in the face of continuing substantial gross outflows, the fact that individuals return with
additional experience from working abroad may actually enhance the return from education.
Over the period 1991-96 there was a return to small net immigration, first seen in the 1970s,
reflecting the boom in the domestic labour market, so that by 1996 nearly 20% of the 30-34
age group were returned emigrants. Currently there is substantial net immigration. Over half
of those coming to work in Ireland are returning emigrants but in the last 3 or 4 years
between 40% and 50% of them are not Irish citizens. In the case of immigrants whether or
not they are Irish, the vast bulk of them have third level education (Barrett and Trace, 1998)
and they have played an important role in helping the economy to grow at such a rapid pace.
The high level of education of immigrants contrasts with the experience of other EU
countries.
From an economic point of view this high degree of mobility, especially for skilled labour,
greatly increases the elasticity of labour supply. As discussed later, this has tended to keep
Irish skilled labour costs from rising rapidly. It makes the Irish labour market closer to that of
a US state than that of other EU national labour markets. What is also interesting is the extent
to which the mobility now involves skilled individuals who are citizens of other EU countries
– the UK, Germany, France, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands. While a significant
number of these immigrants are spouses or partners of returning Irish emigrants (Finneran
and Punch, 1999), many of them have no traditional association with the country.
For a society which is exceptionally homogeneous in terms of race, religion and culture, the
returning emigrants have played an important role in introducing new experience, new ways
of doing business, new expectations and a new vitality. In the 1950s when the traffic was all
one way – outwards - Ireland was a rather claustrophobic insular society. This was
symbolised in the rather heavy censorship which was still exercised on literary works, but it
went much deeper than that. This is reflected in the literature of the time and the
representations in the cinema of the period.
Immediately after independence there was a substantial outflow of Protestant citizens who
found the new state unappealing, in spite of the well developed safeguards for their religious
and civil rights. This loss of diversity was probably serious for the future development of the
country, both culturally and economically. It is only today that returning emigrants, and some
7immigration, is beginning to provide a more diverse culture and a more exciting environment,
suitable to rapid economic growth. Part of the recent transformation in society and the
economy must be attributed to this influx of additional skilled labour with new ideas and
skills and new approaches to the many problems which Ireland faces.
2.2. European Integration
A vital feature of the changing Ireland is the opening up of the economy and society as whole
to the wider European experience. In 1922 Ireland was the first of the British colonies to
break away since the United States in 1776, and it had to write its own rules. In the first years
of independence there was a learning process when new patterns of behaviour and new ways
of thinking had to be developed. In the world of the 1920s and 1930s Ireland took the road of
protection and self-sufficiency tending to close off the influence of the outside world. The
fact that two of Ireland’s greatest writers of the period (Joyce and Beckett) chose to live in
Paris was symptomatic of this process. Its economic manifestation was the erection of very
high tariff barriers to the outside world and its prime political manifestation was the decision
to remain neutral in the second World War. Reading the speeches of the Taoiseach (prime
minister) of the time, de Valera, one gets the impression of a country that did not much like
the outside world and reading some of the speeches of the British prime minister of the time,
Churchill, one gets the feeling that that feeling was mutual! This period of isolation left a
serious economic and political legacy after the war.
The atmosphere in Ireland in the 1950s seems to have proved stultifying for writers, artists
and business alike. The advent of free trade from the beginning of the 1960s was only one,
and probably not the most important, aspect of the opening up of the country to outside
influences and ideas. The advent of television played an important role in the process. From
the 1950s onwards the ready access to British television on the east coast of the island helped
keep people in touch with the rapidly changing post-war world. It also helped raise
expectations in terms of living standards and the level of provision of public services.
However, probably the most important force for change in the economy and domestic politics
was entry into the then EEC, along with the UK, in 1973.
Ireland was not unique in 20th century Western Europe in experiencing independence from a
much larger and dominant neighbour; Finland, Norway, and Latvia, for example, have also
shared this experience. In the case of both Ireland and Finland, their experience of the first 25
years of independence has coloured their response to the European Union and European
institutions. Public opinion in Ireland, and also in Finland, is much more favourable to the
8institutions of the EU than is the case, for example, in Sweden or the United Kingdom.
Ireland, and even more so Finland, suffered in their initial years of independence from the
absence of a supranational framework of law to regulate their relations with their former
Imperial power. In the case of Ireland, even in economic matters, the relative generosity of
successive UK governments eased the problem. However, up to Ireland’s membership of the
European Union, its external economic relations were characterised by a dependent
relationship on the UK. For Finland relations with the Soviet Union proved much more
traumatic, culminating in the experience of the Second World War. As a result, for Ireland
and Finland membership of the European Union is, in a way, the culmination of a long path
to independence. The fact that certain powers and rights may be limited as a result of EU
membership is more than offset by the benefit that each country is legally equal to its much
more powerful neighbours and that the legal framework exists to enforce their right to protect
their national economic and political interests.
This new liberating experience of EU membership took many different forms. in the case of
the Irish Department of Finance in 1972 all the files on external economic relations – with the
UK – were sent to the basement. These files were never again looked at after EU membership
and, instead, the focus of attention shifted to a new multilateral world where Ireland was both
legally, and de facto, equal to all other members. It took some time to realise that the UK was
not always the opposition but often a friend and ally in furthering our common interests.
Where the UK was an opponent it was only one of many and our allies frequently included
France and Germany. In the sphere of agriculture, which was still of vital importance to the
economy in 1973, Ireland has hid under a French umbrella protecting the CAP for 25 years.
This changed environment within the EU not only strengthened Ireland’s economic
independence, but it also provided new ideas, a stimulus to look at a wider world and a
knowledge that there were many different ways of achieving desired social and economic
objectives. The cultural impact of EU membership has spread much wider than the civil
service. For example, in the field of industrial relations it has also been an important factor
brining about change. Since the mid-1980s, while the UK pursued a rather contentious and
legalistic approach to reform, Irish trade unions, employers, and successive governments
drew on the experience of their colleagues in Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark to
develop a “partnership approach” (Sexton and O’Connell, 1997). This involves regular
negotiations between the social partners which have resulted in a series of agreements
covering not only pay rates, but also taxation policy and policy on publicly provided services.
9While this approach may have some draw-backs, it has contributed to a major change in wage
formation and a period of relative peace in industrial relations over more than a decade.2 The
rate of increase in real wage rates has been much lower than economic models, based on the
experience of the 1970s, would have suggested, but employees have benefited instead from a
substantial reduction in the tax burden and a massive increase in numbers employed (Fitz
Gerald, 1999).
In the field of monetary policy Ireland’s experience is also rather different from that of larger
EU member states. Ireland, since its independence, has had little experience of attempting to
implement an independent monetary policy.3 Even since 1979, when monetary policy was
nominally determined by the Central Bank of Ireland, in practice it was the Bundesbank
which played the crucial role in determining turning points in policy. As a result, there is a
feeling that, in ceding the right to determine monetary policy to the European Central Bank,
there is no loss of sovereignty when that sovereignty never really existed (Baker, Fitz Gerald
and Honohan, 1996).
The opening up of the Irish economy to the outside world with the reduction in tariff barriers
from 1960 onwards was thus part of a wider process of change. This change was cemented by
membership of the EU in 1973. However, the adjustment to the changing circumstances had
costs as well as benefits. The costs were seen in the closure of many businesses as the
economy adjusted, a process which Central Europe today understands very well. This process
of adjustment continued into the 1980s but it is now largely complete for the manufacturing
sector and what problems remain affect the services sector. A corollary of this process of
adjustment by existing industry was the introduction of new foreign owned businesses across
a wide range of sectors, but especially in certain key areas of manufacturing industry. The
new multinational industry came to Ireland because it offered access to the EU market.
Without such access Ireland would have been of little interest as a location for investment
from the early 1970s onwards.
Membership of the EU was particularly important in the access it gave to the wider EU
market for agricultural produce under the CAP. Even before membership in 1973, the impact
                                                     
2 The fact that a number of the Trade Unions involved in this process were actually branches of UK
unions is interesting.
3 Given the one for one parity between the Irish and the UK pounds until 1979 (with nor margins
clearing), Irish monetary policy was effectively determined by the Bank of England. Between 1979 and
1998 the Bundesbank had the major role in determining policy. Since January 1999 Ireland has been a
member of the EMU.
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of the impending CAP began changing Irish agriculture. While the CAP and the agricultural
sector were crucial to the economy at the time of membership, their significance has steadily
fallen. Nonetheless, the EU receipts as part of the CAP remain larger than all the receipts
under the Structural Funds and the direction CAP reform will take in the next decade will
still be a key issue for future Irish governments.
In the long run, more important than any other economic feature of EU membership, is the
access to the single market. The single market reforms were expected to bring significantly
greater benefits to Ireland than was the related increase in Structural Funds (Bradley et al.,
1992). The extent of the integration of the Irish economy into the wider EU economy means
that Ireland’s economic interests are now inextricably tied up with those of our EU
neighbours. For example, Ireland paid part of the costs of German unification in the early
1990s as high interest rates temporarily cost up to 3 or 4 percent of total employment
(Bradley, Fitz Gerald and McCoy, 1991) but this was a small price to pay in terms of the
wider benefits of EU membership.
In recent years the EU Structural Fund process has caught the public imagination (outside
Ireland as much as in it) as a manifestation of the effects of EU membership. While Ireland
benefited from receipts from the Social and Regional Funds from the mid 1970s, the reforms
introduced as part of the Single Market process resulted in a significant increase in receipts.
These were further increased as part of the Maastricht treaty. Figure 5 shows how the receipts
rose rapidly at the beginning of the 1990s. Since 1993 they have tended to fall and while they
will continue into the next decade they will not again attain their high level of 1992-93.
Figure 5: Structural Fund Receipts Figure 6: The Impact of the CSF
Structural Funds
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The growth in EU transfers from the Structural Funds from the late 1980s made a significant
direct contribution to growth at an important time of economic change. On the demand side,
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as shown in Figure 6, the first Community Support Framework (CSF)4 from 1989-93 had
raised the level of GNP by 3.5% above where it would have been if there had been no CSF
(Fitz Gerald and Keegan, 1993). If the EU transfers had been cut off after 1993 Irish GNP
would in the long run have been up to 1% above its base level due to the continuing supply
effects of the CSF funded investment (e.g. in roads and education). Because of the decline in
significance of the CSF transfers in recent years the demand side stimulus from the second
round (1994-99) is somewhat lower (Fitz Gerald, 1998). Of course the supply side benefits of
the new capital stock (human and physical) which is continually being put in place, funded
under the CSF, is building up the economy’s productive potential. Over the course of the
1990s the transfers as part of the structural funds process probably added something under a
half a per cent a year to the growth rate or a cumulative 4% by 1999. If all transfers were to
end after 1999 (they will, in fact, be phased out over the next decade) the level of GNP would
be permanently something over 2% above what it would have been without the aid.
At least as important as the actual investment has been the way the structural fund process
has affected the administrative and political system. The increase under the first CSF
encouraged the government to raise public investment from its extremely low level in the late
1980s. Without such a stimulus Ireland could have found itself suffering from
underinvestment in the face of rapid growth in recent years.
The CSF process has forced the introduction of long-term planning. In the past there was a
serious problem where investment projects stopped and started in line with short-term
economic pressures on governments. This was very wasteful. Now an investment  plan is
formulated and subsequently implemented without major interruption. In addition, the need
to satisfy the ghost of Mrs Thatcher and the more substantial ghost of Chancellor Kohl that
their money is well spent resulted in the introduction of a fairly rigorous set of evaluation
procedures, which has helped change the way the administration approaches public
expenditure. In the past the only question once money had been voted was whether it had
been spent in accordance with regulations. Now there is increasing interest in assessing how
effective the expenditure has been.
In summary, the structural funds have played an important role in developing the economy at
a crucial point in Irish economic history. However, they are now of declining significance
and their contribution has been very much more limited than that of the other major driving
                                                     
4 This is the name given to the EU programme covering the structural fund transfers.
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forces discussed in this paper. What is also important is that Ireland, unlike many
underdeveloped regions in receipt of aid, has not become dependent on the transfers. For
example, the Mezzogiorno in Italy has received huge transfers from the rest of Italy for
decades, transfers which are essential in maintaining its standard of living. By investing the
transfers Ireland has ensured that when they decline in the next decade Ireland will have
something left to show for it in the enhanced education of the work-force and the improved
transport infrastructure.
2.3. The Educational Revolution
In the immediate post-war years all of Northern Europe, with the exception of  Ireland, made
major changes in their educational systems. In the rest of what is now the EU a substantial
programme of investment undertaken, upgrading the educational system and greatly
increasing participation in both second and third level. In Ireland, by contrast, the immediate
post-war years saw no recognition of the need for change in this area. It took approximately
20 years before the policy of educational neglect was reversed in 1967.
Figure 7 Figure 8
Educational Attainment, Males
1994, by age, % of population
Source: Labour Force Survey
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Educational Attainment, Females
by year of birth, % of total living in Ireland
Source: Labour Force Survey, 1994























<1930
1930-35
1935-39
1940-44
1945-49
1950-54
1955-59
1960-64
1965-69
0
20
40
60
80
100
Primary Inter. Leaving Third


Following on the publication of a report supported by the OECD Investment in Education5 in
1966 free second level education was introduced in 1967. This development signalled the
start of a strategy of investing in education which has been pursued with consistency by
successive governments ever since that date. Even in the 1980s, when many other sectors
suffered severe cut-backs, the education system survived reasonably intact. In fact the rise in
                                                     
5This study was undertaken with the help of the OECD. It was commissioned in 1962 and published in
1966. Among its authors were Professor P. Lynch of UCD and Professor M. O’Donoghue of TCD.
13
participation rates since 1980 has been even greater than that which occurred under the first
15 years of the “free education” policy.
This change in policy has had a profound effect on the Irish economy and society and its full
impact is far from complete with participation rates continuing to rise rapidly in recent years.
The impact on the labour market has been complex and this factor is vital in explaining the
current rapid growth in employment. The fruits of a consistent policy of investment are only
becoming clear in the 1990s. This issue is discussed later.
Figure 9
Educational Attainment of Labour Force
% of labour force aged under 65
Source: Labour Force Surveys and ESRI Forecast
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This long-tailed impact of the change in educational policy is not surprising. Many of the
other countries of Northern Europe, which invested heavily in education in the immediate
post-war years, saw rapid rates of growth up to and including the 1970s. Ireland began 20
years late and is seeing the benefits of the investment 20 years after its Northern European
counterparts (Koman and Marin, 1996).
The effects of the change in participation on the educational attainment of the population are
shown in Figures 7 and 8. For those born 65 years ago, who are now reaching retirement age,
approximately two thirds of the cohort left school with only primary education (at age 14 or
less). On average women have been slightly better educated than men in the Republic
throughout the last two generations but the gap has until recently been relatively small.
For those born in the late 1960s, aged 25 to 30 in 1994, early school leavers were down to
only 10% of the cohort with around 60% having at least a leaving cert. and around a quarter
having some form of third level education. This increase in participation rates has continued
apace with around 80% of the 1995 school-leaving cohort having a leaving cert. and over
14
50% continuing on to some form of third level education.6 The forecasts for the educational
attainment of the labour force to 2011 are shown in Figure 9. This Figure illustrates how,
even after a number of decades of investment in education, the impact of the continuing
change in the level of human capital will affect the economy and society for some
considerable time.
2.4. Demographic Change
The birth rate in Ireland in the period up to 1980 was well above the norm for most of
Western Europe. Since then it has fallen fairly steadily (Figure 10). Even after 15 years of
decline it is still above the rates common in other Western European countries. However, as
shown in Figure 11, completed family size, (proxied by the Total Fertility Rate - TFR) is now
close to that in the UK. This paradox of a high birth rate coinciding with relatively low
fertility is explained by the fact that a relatively high proportion of the female population is,
to use the demographers phrase, “at risk” (in the age group which potentially has babies).
Figure 11 shows the implications of the continuing decline in fertility for Ireland in 2006. As
can be seen from these data, on present trends Ireland is heading for a relatively low fertility
rate, closer to that in Southern Europe than to the higher Scandinavian norm.
Figure 10 Figure 11
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The future path of the fertility rate still remains very uncertain. The increasing prosperity and
opportunities for skilled work will probably tend to reduce it further. The rising educational
attainment of the female population is particularly important as it enhances their earning
power and is a very important factor in increasing labour force participation. What is
                                                     
6 The figures for participation are significantly higher for women than for men.
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particularly interesting is the fact that for women aged 25 to 34 the labour force participation
decision is now little affected by marriage. It is the decision to have children, whether the
parents are married or not, which is associated with a change in participation (Walsh, 1993).
Marriage is proving to be a diminishing factor in explaining fertility in Ireland with over one
third of all first pregnancies occurring to single mothers. It is possible that the recent rapid
fall in the birth rate may only represent a decision to postpone having children and that the
forecast for fertility, shown here, could prove low.
The effects of the “baby boom” of the 1970s can be seen in the cohort which will be aged 30
to 39 in 2011 (Figure 12). This cohort is currently aged 15 to 24 and it has benefited from the
high birth rate of the 1970s and the low rate of emigration of families in the intervening
years. The size of this cohort relative to all others will continue to influence the Irish
population profile for decades to come.
The very rapid fall off in the population aged over 70 in 2011 (currently aged over 55)
reflects not only expected mortality in the intervening years but more importantly the
continuing effects of the very high level of emigration in the 1950s. This means that the
number of people in the retired age groups (over 65) will remain relatively low for another 20
years.
Figure 12: Population Structure by Age, 2011
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A crucial factor in the growth in the labour force in the last decade has been the increased
participation of women. Participation by women in the labour force was very low by
European standards in 1980. Even today it is well below the EU norm. The pattern of
participation by women is strongly affected in the long run by their educational attainment. It
is also affected by changing circumstances in the labour market. For women with a minimal
education their participation rate is still very low, reflecting the fact that the costs of working
(in terms of child care) are high and the potential gains have been low. In the younger age
groups it seems likely that a significant number of these women have children and that this is
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affecting participation. For those women with a third level education the participation rate
was traditionally much higher reflecting much greater financial incentives (Fahey and Fitz
Gerald, 1997, 1998). Between 1988 and 1997 participation rates rose particularly strongly for
those who had completed second level education (Figure 13).
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The rapid rise in participation in education has had the effect of greatly reducing participation
rates for men and women under 25. However, the rising educational attainment of successive
cohorts of young men and women entering the labour force will tend to boost participation in
older age groups. Generally, participation rates for women will continue to rise over the next
decade. When taken together with the baby-boom bulge moving through the educational
system, it means that labour supply will rise by up to 1.5% a year over the next decade.
Figure 14: Economic Dependency
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Much of the concern about a demographic “crisis” in western countries has arisen from
worsening dependency trends. Ireland is in the unusual position that its dependency levels are
improving and are likely to be lower in 30 years time than they were at various points in the
last 30 years. The proportion of young people in the population, which remained fairly
constant between 1960 and the mid-1980s began to fall rapidly in the last 10 years, and it will
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continue to fall over the coming 15 years. The proportion of elderly in the population, which
remained very stable since 1960, will not show a major change till after 2010. When taken
together, these trends mean that, having had a high percentage of the population in the
inactive age groups for 30 years, this position is now changing quite rapidly in a favourable
direction.
Since the 1960s, Ireland has had economic dependency levels (defined as the numbers not
working in the population compared to the numbers actually in paid employment) that were
extraordinarily high by the standards of other western countries (Figure 14). In the early part
of that period, Ireland's high dependency was caused mainly by the contraction in the active
population as a result of young-adult emigration in the 1950s, coupled with a moderately high
fertility rate and an elderly population that was large by the standards of the time (Fahey and
Fitz Gerald, 1998). By the 1980s, the active population had recovered in size (partly because
of return migration among those who had left in earlier decades), even though the child
population had also grown rapidly. However, apart from a brief favourable period in the
1970s, economic dependency remained exceptionally high because of a combination of high
unemployment and low labour force participation rates within the population in the active
ages.
The mid-1980s witnessed peak levels of economic dependency. This contributed significantly
to the economic problems of the time. A small work force was supporting a very large child
population, a very large number of unemployed and a reasonably large elderly population.
The number of women in home duties was also very large. The majority of women in home
duties should be counted as economically productive rather than dependent and as important
providers of support within families. However, as an informal economic activity, housework
is untaxed and does not contribute directly to public revenues. In addition, it is likely that a
certain proportion of women in home duties were underemployed or “hidden” unemployed.
The trend in the economic dependency ratio began to turn in a positive direction in the mid to
late 1980s. The numbers in the dependent age groups began to fall and, at the same time, the
numbers at work began to grow, so that the dependency balance improved considerably. This
positive trend is likely to continue, especially over the next 10 to 15 years, so that economic
dependency will be markedly lower in the next decade than at any time since the 1960s. At
the peak of economic dependency in the mid-1980s, there were nearly 230 dependants for
every 100 workers. According to the latest forecasts this ratio will have fallen to 125
dependants per 100 workers by the year 2010, well below the current EU average. Even
though a certain degree of population ageing is likely to have occurred over that period,
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labour force growth will also mean a slight decline in the number of elderly dependants per
100 workers – from 35 in 1986 to 28 in 2010.
The combination of unfavourable conditions which created the extreme dependency levels of
the 1960s through to the 1980s are now passing away and are unlikely to recur in as extreme
a form at any point over the next three decades. Ireland is thus moving into a new era of
easing dependency burdens, no matter how those dependency burdens are defined or
measured. This again reinforces the view that even in the long term, the outlook as far as
dependency is concerned, is a great deal more favourable than the record has been over
recent decades.
3. A Clockwork Mouse?
While Ireland’s current economic performance has all the appearances of being a “Celtic
tiger” this image clouds the reality of the economic performance over the last 30 years. When
viewed within this wider context, the performance still looks striking, but the wider backdrop
of the mistakes of the late 1970s, and the painful adjustment of the 1980s, makes it clear that
this is not an economic “miracle”. To some extent the surprise was the poor performance of
the economy in previous decades, which left major room for improvement in the 1990s.
This Section outlines Ireland’s record on output and employment growth. In order to
understand this record it first discusses the role of labour supply and it then consider factors
affecting labour demand. At the end of this Section the evidence is brought together to
explain the key economic mechanisms underlying the rapid convergence of Irish living
standards to the EU average.7 In a sense Ireland is like a clockwork mouse which is fully
wound up. Over the next decade, as it moves forward, the clockwork motor can be expected
to run down.
3.1. The Record
In the late 1970s the then Irish government pursued a “dash for growth” policy which
involved a huge fiscal injection. Even at the time economists warned that this was
unsustainable and, in the early 1980s, when the storm of world recession hit, it almost
wrecked the Irish economy. The result was a period of almost 10 years of fiscal retrenchment
                                                     
7 A wide range of factors have contributed to the success; see Bradley, Fitz Gerald, Honohan and
Kearney, 1997 and Barry, 1999 for a fuller discussion of the different factors.
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in the 1980s as successive governments tried to put the economy together again. The process
was extremely painful, involving both major increases in taxation and a massive cut-back in
state expenditure. In the 1987-88 period public sector employment was cut by 10%, a figure
that no other OECD country has managed since the war. As shown in Figure 15, 8 out of 10
budgets over the course of the period 1980 to 1989 were deflationary. This was necessary to
correct the huge imbalance in the public finances and it represented a strongly pro-cyclical
fiscal stance at a time of very low growth. Over the 10 years, the cumulative deflationary
impetus imparted by fiscal policy amounted to just 8 per cent of GNP. It is not surprising that
the Irish economy did not shine over that period.
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1995
 1980
 
 
 
 
1985
 
 
 
 
1990
 
 
 
 
1995
 
 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
%
 o
f G
N
P
Bradley, Fitz Gerald, Honohan and Kearney, 1997
Measure of Budgetary Stance 
Figure 16
60-65 65-70 70-75 75-80 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-00
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Average Annual Percentage Change
GNP
20
Figure 16 shows the growth rate for GNP for each of the 5 year periods from 1960 to 1990.
With the exception of the first half of the 1980s, when the fiscal retrenchment knocked the
economy way off course, there was relatively little deviation from an apparent trend growth
of 4% a year. For the more recent period 1990-95 the growth rate picks up to 5% and the
economy is currently growing at a rate well above its past trend. It looks as if the average
growth rate over the 5 years 1995-00 will be over 6 % a year.
Figure 17
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Probably more remarkable than the apparent pick up in the trend growth rate is the
experience on employment growth. By contrast with a dismal performance in the 1980s,
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employment has grown and is growing at an unprecedented rate in the 1990s (Figure 17). The
bulk of this employment growth is occurring in the private sector. However, there has been a
somewhat smaller reduction in unemployment (Figure 18) reflecting a rapid rise in the labour
force.
3.2. The Labour Market - Supply
Over the last 30 years the Irish labour market has been profoundly affected by a number of
different policies pursued domestically, which have altered the supply of labour: changes in
the education system and changes in the social welfare system. These have had the effect of
increasing the supply of skilled labour and gradually reducing the supply of unskilled labour.
Changes in the world economy have affected the demand for labour in Ireland. In 1960, with
a high level of protection, the demand for unskilled labour in the economy was high. There
was little competition from suppliers in the Far East who faced much lower labour costs.
However, over the past 30 years labour costs have risen in Ireland at the same time as the
Irish and the EU economy has opened up to world-wide competition resulting in a fall in
demand for unskilled labour in Ireland. By contrast, the demand for skilled labour has risen
world-wide. In Ireland the interaction of these different forces has determined the rates of
return for different kinds of labour and the numbers employed.
Figure 19: Unskilled Labour Market
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In the 1950s, at a time when the UK had developed a sophisticated social welfare safety net,
no such protection was available in Ireland. As a result, unskilled labour in Ireland faced a
choice between emigration to the UK, generally to take up employment there, or employment
at any price in Ireland. Figure 19 illustrates this position for unskilled labour (L) where the
supply of unskilled labour is vertical at full employment and horizontal at the floor provided
by social welfare payments. Initially the going wage rate in Ireland WL0 was above the rate of
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social welfare payments Ws0 leaving unskilled employment at L0.  The shape of the supply
curve for unskilled labour was greatly influenced by the propensity of unskilled labour to
emigrate to the UK. The evidence suggests that in equilibrium the Irish unemployment rate
was 4 percentage points above the UK rate fixing labour supply at L*. Irish unemployment
then settled at U0 . However, over the period from 1960 to the early 1980s there were
substantial improvements in the rates of social welfare payments (Figure 20). By the early
1980s the rate of social welfare payments Ws1 effectively set a minimum wage pulling up the
market wage rate WL1 so that the supply curve for unskilled labour became horizontal at the
rate of social welfare payments. The result was a fall in employment to L1. In turn this tended
to reduce the labour force as people emigrated to the UK keeping the unemployment rate 4
percentage points above the UK rate.
Figure 20
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Thus the impact of improvements in the social welfare system was to reduce the supply of
unskilled labour. The ultimate effect on numbers unemployed in the 1970s was probably
small; the social welfare system in the UK was still more attractive than that in Ireland and
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rates of pay for unskilled labour in the UK exceeded those in Ireland, making emigration a
feasible option. However, over the course of the 1980s, as the Irish social welfare system was
improved, it became more attractive to be unemployed in Ireland than unemployed in the UK.
In addition, there was a rapid rise in unemployment in the UK, especially among unskilled,
which had a knock on effect in Ireland. Finally, the rates of pay for unskilled labour in
Ireland approached, and in some cases exceeded, those in the UK. An example of this is the
relative rates of pay for the textile sector in Ireland compared to the UK shown in Figure 21.
As the textile sector has one of the highest percentages of unskilled labour of any
manufacturing sector, the data in Figure 21 provide a reasonable proxy for relative
movements in unskilled pay rates in the two economies.
Simultaneously with these changes in the supply of unskilled labour, there was a fall in
demand. The opening up of the economy to competition meant that those companies
operating in the tradable sector which depended on unskilled labour faced increasing
competition. Corcoran, Hughes, and Sexton, 1993 document the effect of this on employment
of unskilled labour. Since the early 1970s the absolute number of unskilled labourers has
been cut by almost 50%, with smaller declines in other categories of unskilled labour.
Figure 22
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The impact of the investment in education was also to reduce the supply of unskilled labour.
Figures 22 and 23 illustrate the impact of increased educational investment. In the market for
skilled labour (Figure 22) potential supply was increased by educating a proportion of the
supply of unskilled labour, Ha - Hb. This shifted the intercept of the supply curve for skilled
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labour outwards. However, faced with a downward sloping demand curve, employment of
skilled labour increased from H0 to H1 leaving H1-H2 of the newly educated labour supply
without skilled jobs. It is assumed that they then get first choice of unskilled jobs (if they do
not emigrate). The result is more skilled people employed but the increase is less than the
increase in supply.
Figure 23: Unskilled Labour Market
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In the market for unskilled labour (Figure 23) the wage rate is, by assumption, set by the
prevailing rate of social welfare so that the supply curve is horizontal over a considerable
range. Total potential supply of unskilled labour before investment in education is L.  While
Ha - Hb  unskilled labour was educated to become skilled labour not all of them found skilled
employment. The reduction in the supply of labour on the unskilled market is Ha to H0 with
Hb-H0 skilled workers competing on the unskilled market. The result is a reduction in total
supply on that market and a corresponding reduction in unemployment. All of this assumes
zero migration. This picture, while greatly oversimplified, characterises the situation on the
domestic labour market in the late 1980s.
The implications of this analysis are that, when faced with a fixed downward sloping demand
for skilled labour, any increase in supply will not be fully matched by an increase in
employment. However, unless the supply of skilled labour is infinitely elastic there will be
some increase in total employment in the economy, as in the second half of the 1980s. While
the majority of the skilled workers will find employment in positions that require their skills,
there will also be some increase in the number of skilled workers in jobs that do not require
their full talents. In the case of skilled labour, an increase in supply will tend to reduce wage
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rates (provided that the supply curve is not infinitely elastic). However, the corresponding
reduction in supply of unskilled labour need not affect the going wage rate if the social
welfare rates already set a floor to wages in that market. In assessing the full impact of the
investment in education it is necessary to take account of not only the change in employment,
but also of the resulting change in wage rates.
The situation since the 1990s has been rather different. While the supply of skilled labour has
continued to shift outwards, the demand has also shifted outwards. This rapid increase in the
demand for skilled labour is a taking place throughout the developed world. In the UK and
the US the effect since the beginning of the 1980s has been to increase the wage differential
between skilled and unskilled workers (Nickell and Bell, 1995). This reflects the fact that the
supply of skilled labour has not grown very rapidly in these countries. The big investment in
education occurred much earlier than in Ireland and the post-war baby boom generation are
already all in the labour force.
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In Ireland, by contrast, the increase in demand as the demand curve shifts out to DH1  (Figure
22) has coincided with the rapid rise in supply. The net result has been that the wage rate for
skilled labour has not shown anything like the change in the UK and the US. Nonetheless it
has meant that the full benefits of the investment in education has been felt in increased
employment and productivity as the additional skilled workers have found employment
suitable to their skills. Figure 24 shows the average earnings of women  employed in 1987
and 1994 classified by their level of education (Callan, 1993 and Callan and Wrenn, 1994).8
(The figures for men are fairly similar). It shows that the premium in terms of wages which
                                                     
8 The picture for males is rather similar to that for females.
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university education commanded in 19879 changed little over that period. Later work by
Barrett, Callan and Nolan, 1999, indicates that, if anything, the returns to education actually
increased over that period of rapidly increasing supply.
Figure 25: Index of Human Capital Figure 26: Growth in Human Capital
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Under certain assumptions (Durkan, Harmon and Fitzgerald, 1999)10 the results from Callan,
1993, and Callan and Wrenn, 1994, can be used to form a composite index of the supply of
human capital in the Irish economy. To the extent that the returns to education may have
fallen between 1970 and 1987 the index will tend to overestimate the impact of human capital
on the economy over that period. However, for the 1987-94 period the apparent stability of
the returns to education suggests that the index may provide a reasonably reliable guide to the
impact of investment in human capital.
Figure 25 shows this index of human capital for the adult population. For the purpose of
comparison indices of human capital for Austria and Germany are also shown. These latter
indices are constructed on a slightly different basis11 in Koman and Marin, 1996, but the
results are likely to be broadly comparable to our own index. They tend to confirm the
assertion made earlier that the benefits from investment in human capital are occurring later
in Ireland than in other Northern European EU members. Figure 26 shows the rate of growth
in the index for Ireland. The movement in the index of human capital reflects the fact that as
each person retires, generally with only a primary education, they are replaced by a person
                                                     
9 Roughly a doubling compared to wages of those with leaving certificates
10 Among other things, it is assumed the weak homothetic separability of labour from other factors of
production holds. It also assumes perfect competition in the labour market so that the wage rates of the
different types of labour are equal to their marginal products.
11 Instead of weighting by the average earnings of each category of labour the weights are the total
wages of the different categories.
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with a good leaving certificate or a third level education. As a result of this switch, output
will rise, as reflected in the increase in average earnings. The growth in the index was quite
slow in the 1960s at around 0.3 percentage points a year. From 1970 onwards it averaged
around 0.5 percentage points a year, and its growth reached a peak in the first half of the
1990s, suggesting that investment in human capital was contributing around one percentage
point a year to the growth in that period. While the rate of growth in the index is expected to
slow over time, as the average educational attainment of the labour force rises, the index will
still be rising at around a half of a percentage point a year at the end of the next decade. It
would suggest that currently around one percentage point of the growth rate may be
attributable to the rising educational attainment of the labour force through the effects on
raising productivity.  However, the full implications of this rise in human capital can only be
assessed within the context of a wider model of the economy.
The elasticity of supply of labour in Ireland has been greatly increased by the extent of
migration. If the labour market tightens in Ireland firms have been able to attract workers
from abroad without any great difficulty. This reflects the big, though diminishing stock of
Irish emigrants (Fahey and Fitz Gerald, 1998). When the labour market was weak in Ireland
and unemployment tended upwards Irish people sought better opportunities abroad (Kearney,
1998). Fitz Gerald, 1999, argues that this link through the labour market has played an
important role in the gradual convergence of Irish labour costs to the UK level over the
period 1960 to 1980.
3.3. Labour Market – Demand
As discussed earlier, in the past there was significant emigration of skilled labour, especially
in the late 1980s. Why is the rise in skilled labour supply now translating into increased
employment rather than emigration? The answer lies in factors affecting the demand for
labour in Ireland.
The Irish economy over the last seventy years has provided a very interesting test-bed of the
effects of economic integration. Having been an integral part of the United Kingdom until
independence in 1922, there were a series of changes over the following ten years which
introduced major restrictions on trade12. In the early 1930s very high tariffs encouraged the
                                                     
12There was free movement of funds within the sterling area until Irish entry into the EMS in 1979. However, until
the mid 1950s, there were extensive controls on direct foreign investment in Ireland.
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development of local industry to supply the domestic market resulting in a substantial growth
in industrial employment. However, the new firms were very small with low productivity.
With the progressive dismantling of tariffs from the late 1950s the Irish economy, including
the protected industrial sector, was opened to major new forces through the subsequent
growth in trade. Two landmarks in this process were the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement
of 1965, freeing trade with the UK, and EU entry in 1973, which abolished all remaining
barriers to trade with the EU.
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The most obvious economic manifestation of the gradual opening up of the economy since
1960 was the growth in the importance of foreign trade and the diversification of the markets
where that trade took place. As shown in Figure 27, since 1960 the proportion of Irish output
which is exported has more than doubled. Initially the process of opening up the economy to
free trade began with a unilateral dismantling of extremely high tariff barriers. The opening
up of the economy to the rest of Europe also began in the 1960s and this is reflected in the
diversification of trade which has taken place since that date. Entry into the EU, which took
place at the beginning of 1973, was thus part of a longer-term process of integration.
A key feature of the changing structure of the Irish economy from the end of the 1950s has
been the growing importance of direct foreign investment, in particular in the manufacturing
sector. In 1960 the Irish economy was heavily dependent on agriculture. The concentration on
this sector was much greater than for other neighbouring countries. There was a need to shift
attention to the industrial sector so that industrial growth would counter-balance the
inevitable decline in the importance of agriculture. This was reflected in the change in
industrial policy in the late 1950s to favour foreign investment in manufacturing. It is now
clear that this process has played a very important role in transforming the economy. The
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strategy, which relied originally on tax breaks, now relies heavily on the availability of
skilled labour to attract foreign firms. The concentration on certain sub-sectors of
manufacturing, such as computers and electronics, also appears to have been beneficial.
It is important to recognise the consistency with which industrial policy has been pursued by
all governments for 40 years. Such a strategic approach to economic policy mirrors that of
some Asian countries in more recent times, and it highlights the importance of creating an
environment of certainty for foreign investors. While the extent of the concentration on
developing the multinational sector at the expense of attention to existing domestic firms has
frequently been called into question, some of the promised fruits of that policy are currently
to be seen in the rapid growth in the manufacturing sector.
While the low rate of corporation tax has long been the key incentive for locating investment
in Ireland, in the last decade the availability of skilled labour at a reasonable cost has grown
in importance (Barry and Bradley, 1997). The location decision of multinational firms is a
function of the relative cost of production in a range of different possible competing locations
(Bradley and Fitz Gerald, 1988). The cost of production itself is affected by the tax regime,
labour costs, the cost of capital and the cost of other services bought in locally.
As well as bringing a demand for skilled labour, the advent of multinational firms also
brought new management skills and access to a range of technologies which were not
available locally. In recent years there has been some sign of a transfer of these skills to local
firms. In addition, the growth in the critical mass of firms operating in the high technology
sectors has seen a growth in the local labour market’s supply of necessary skills.
The high proportion of foreign direct investment in the Irish manufacturing sector and its
export-oriented development makes the Irish economy quite unique among the EU peripheral
members. At this stage foreign owned firms account for over half of all output in
manufacturing and almost half of all employment (Barry, Bradley, and O’Malley, 1999).
Foreign owned manufacturing firms export almost 90% of their output whereas Irish-owned
manufacturing firms export around 36% of output. Thus the influx of foreign-owned firms
over four decades has played a vital role in opening up the economy.
This development is a result of a deliberate strategy pursued by policy makers. Since the late
1950s Irish industrial policy has offered significant tax incentives and financial packages to
foreign companies to locate production here. This became particularly attractive to foreign
investment since Ireland’s accession to the EU in 1973. The policy was outward-oriented
with more generous tax advantages being offered to exporting firms in the 1970s. Policy
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gradually became concentrated on selected sectors, notably the electronics (including
software), health care and pharmaceuticals sectors.
The result of this outward-oriented strategy was that there was a significant restructuring of
the manufacturing sector, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Production in manufacturing
shifted from dominance by a largely indigenous, low-technology group of “traditional”
industries, which had strong links to the domestic and UK market, to the current dominance
by a group of “high-technology” industries, concentrated in electronics and pharmaceuticals.
This group is largely foreign-owned and export-oriented.
Figure 28: Manufacturing Employment 1970-1996
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During the 1980s this restructuring resulted in a sharp decline in employment in
manufacturing and led many commentators to question the wisdom of deliberately courting
foreign firms. It was argued that the relatively low labour-intensity of production in the
foreign-owned sector, and its low linkages with the domestic economy, signalled a danger
that the indigenous sector was being crowded out and that the economy was becoming
increasingly reliant on foot-loose foreign multinationals.
However, the restructuring within the traditional group of industries was an inevitable
consequence of the progressive opening of the economy to international trade. External
pressures from low-wage competing countries forced many inefficient industries out of
production. Similar adjustments occurred in the manufacturing sector of most developed
countries. Viewed in this context, the pro-active industrial strategy pursued by Irish policy
makers was central to the long-term development of a strong industrial base. Indeed Irish
31
employment in manufacturing between 1975 and 1991 grew more strongly than the EU
average despite its poor performance in absolute terms. The long-term downward trend in EU
manufacturing employment can be seen in Figure 28.
In more recent years employment in manufacturing has picked up strongly. Between 1985
and 1997 employment in manufacturing increased by 62,000, an increase of almost 30 per
cent. Significantly there has also been positive employment growth within the indigenous
sector. The shift towards high-technology production has also led to a significant increase in
the skill intensity of employment.
The concentration on a small group of sectors means that Ireland is emerging as a major
location for specific industries. This leads to spill-over effects into the indigenous sector both
in terms of received expertise and technological know-how and direct linkages with the
domestic economy and local labour market. For example in the software sector recent
evidence suggests that many small indigenously owned firms have established niche activities
within this sector.
Figure 29: Relative Labour Costs
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In summary, the benefits of a prolonged and consistent policy of targeting foreign investment
has helped in the process of establishing a modern, internationally competitive industrial base
in Ireland. In particular it has meant that Ireland has experienced a major increase in demand
for skilled labour. When taken together with the rapid growth in the private services sector in
areas which also require skilled employees, the combined effect on the demand for skilled
labour has been very great.
While firms employing unskilled labour in the tradable sector have continued to experience
pressures from manufacturers outside the EU, the demand for unskilled labour in certain parts
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of the services sector (retailing and catering) has risen rapidly in the face of the rapid growth
in domestic demand. While still not attractive to some of those eligible for social welfare13,
pay rates are continuing to rise and they are impacting on the numbers of unemployed today.
Figure 29 shows labour cost per hour for the textiles and clothing sector and for computers
for a range of EU countries.14 These data suggest that labour costs in Ireland in the computer
sector were lower in the late 1980s than in most other EU countries, including the UK. By
contrast, costs in the clothing sector were way above those in Portugal and also above the
UK. These data would suggest that skilled labour was relatively cheap in Ireland in the late
1980s and that this has been a factor in attracting major investment in the high technology
sector to Ireland.
Over the last five years the supply of new entrants to the unskilled labour market has been
greatly reduced by the increased participation in education.  While firms employing unskilled
labour in the tradable sector have continued to experience pressures from manufacturers
outside the EU, the demand for unskilled labour in certain parts of the services sector
(retailing and catering) has risen rapidly in the face of the rapid growth in domestic demand.
Anecdotal evidence suggest that the going rate for unskilled labour in the services sector has
risen from £2.50 an hour to over £4 and hour over the last four years. While still not
attractive to all those eligible for social welfare, these rates are continuing to rise and are
having an impact on the numbers of unemployed.
When the increase in labour supply is added to the growth in human capital it would suggest
a rise over the decade in the effective supply of labour of 3% a year. This contrasts with the
situation in many other EU members where the labour force is growing quite slowly and
where the major benefits of the post-war investment in human capital have already been
reaped. This factor, when taken together with the range of social and economic factors
described earlier, explains why the Irish economy is growing more rapidly than those of other
EU members. However, it is also clear that the benefits of the key supply side factors
currently boosting growth will fall gradually over the next 15 years, bringing the Irish
economic experience back into line with that of its neighbours – the clockwork mouse will
have run down. By then the task of bringing the Irish standard of living up to that of its
neighbours will have been completed.
                                                     
13Much of the supply of labour at these rates has come from women or students working part-time who
may not be eligible for social welfare payments.
14 These data include all the costs to employers, including social insurance contributions.
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3.4. The Result
The result of this relatively rapid period of growth will be that Ireland, which in 1990 had a
GDP per head of around 74 per cent of the EU average will, by the year 2000, be well over
100 per cent of the EU average. A more appropriate measure is GNP per head (which
excludes profit repatriations by foreign multinationals); on this measure Ireland can also be
seen to have narrowed the gap in living standards compared to the EU as a whole from 67 per
cent in 1990 to an expected 95 per cent this year. On the basis of this forecast, using GNP,
Ireland should achieve the average standard of living in the EU between 2000 and 2005.
Figure 30
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The pattern of development discussed above suggests a marked change in gear around 1990;
between 1960 and 1990 there was little change in Ireland’s position within the EU measured
in terms of GNP per head (Figure 30). However, it now seems possible that over the next 15
years Ireland may achieve a standard of living among the highest within the EU.
While this may appear to be an exceptional rate of convergence in living standards measured
as GNP per head, the situation looks rather different when considered in terms of output per
person employed – national productivity broadly defined. On this measure the Irish economy
has been converging towards EU standards of productivity fairly steadily since the 1970s
(Figure 30). While we are presently seeing some acceleration in the rate of convergence, this
is not out of character with the past 30 years. The explanation for the contrast between the
two measures, GNP per head and GNP per person employed, lies in the movement in the
economic dependency ratio – the ratio of the population not in paid employment to those who
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are at work. As discussed earlier, while Ireland still has an economic dependency ratio well
above the EU level it will actually fall below the EU average some time in the next decade.
This contrast, and its related effects on living standards represented by the movement in GNP
per head, reflects the window of opportunity which Ireland faces over the next 20 years. The
declining dependency ratio at a time when the ratio is rising elsewhere in the EU will make
possible a rapid rise in living standards in Ireland.
4. Conclusions
4.1. The Irish Agenda
The story of the Irish economic renaissance is not yet finished and if it is to have a happy
ending there is much that still needs to be done. The falling dependency ratio represents a
window of opportunity which will last for fifteen or twenty years; after that the ageing
process will change the character of the economy and of society, just as it has changed
Germany and Japan. From the middle of the next decade the driving factors behind the rapid
growth will begin to slow and the rate of growth in output will gradually decelerate towards
the EU average. The first priority for future Irish governments must be to ensure that the
potential for further growth is realised. There is then the issue of how best to use the fruits of
success. Finally there is a range of long-term strategic issues arising from Ireland’s changing
economic and social structure; what does this imply for its future role in Europe?
Making it Happen
• The development of a political consensus in the 1980s on tackling Ireland’s critical fiscal
problems was very important in the ultimate success of the Irish economic recovery.
Sustaining and reinforcing this partnership approach to income determination so that it
survives the pressures from rising expectations is vital. In the 1950s and 1960s Ireland
decided it wanted a UK standard of living before it had a UK level of productivity, with
serious consequences for employment. For the future Ireland must not aspire to a German
or French standard of living before it has earned it. Unfortunately talk of the “Celtic
Tiger” whets expectations making them ever more difficult to realise in practice.
• Adequate investment must be undertaken to provide the infrastructure essential to future
growth. There is a serious need for additional investment in public transport as well as in
other forms of public infrastructure (Fitz Gerald, Kearney, Morgenroth, and Smyth, 1999).
While Ireland may be approaching an EU level of income, its physical infrastructure, part
of national wealth, still lags behind. Without the new transport investment or new
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investment in housing and related infrastructure, Ireland will not remain an attractive
place to live and this would adversely affect growth prospects.
• The rapid rate of economic growth can not but have noticeable effects on the environment.
The extent to which these effects will add to or detract from the quality of life – the
fundamental aim of growth – will depend on the choice and balance of policies for
environmental protection. In addition to the need for properly functioning protective laws,
where appropriate, economic instruments will need to be at centre stage if successive
governments are not to burden the economy with unnecessary costs of protection. The
pressures on the environment will have to be controlled if economic growth is to produce
a real improvement in welfare.
• While investment in education is paying handsome dividends, it still continues to fail up
to 20% of the population. Finding an effective means of dealing with this problem is of
crucial importance to prevent the growth of an ever more excluded permanent minority of
unemployed.
The Fruits of Growth
• Over the next decade there will be the opportunity to make an impact on major social
problems. For example, there is a pressing need for measures aimed specifically at
improving the skill levels of the long-term unemployed;
• The “demographic dividend” should be invested to provide for long-term needs in twenty
years time when Ireland will begin to grey.
• The changing educational composition of the population has important implications for
regional policy; future regional success will depend as much on where people want to live
as on where the jobs are. The changing expectations of the population affect the type of
jobs which they are prepared to accept. It also affects the type of lifestyle that they will
seek. In the past the principal instrument of regional policy may have been government
intervention through different kinds of subsidies to encourage firms to relocate to less
desirable or less sought after locations. In the future this is unlikely to be as successful as
in the past. Instead, among the factors that will determine where economic activity
prospers will be where the young labour market entrants of tomorrow wish to live. The
promotion of balanced regional development must rely more on policies which enhance a
region’s attractiveness to young adults: for example, the provision of affordable housing,
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entertainment for the increasingly varied tastes of that cohort, and satisfactory
infrastructure, ranging from transport systems to child-minding facilities.
Future Strategy
Ireland’s “coming of age” will require a reorientation of a number of key features of the
strategy that has produced the current renaissance.
• The price of success is the prospect that Ireland may become a net contributor to the EU
by the end of the next decade. Adulthood brings new responsibilities within the EU: to
future new members in Central Europe, and also to third world countries. This change in
circumstances requires a re-examination of Ireland’s policies within the EU. For Ireland,
more painful than the process of weaning from the EU Structural Funds, is likely to be the
need to further radically reform the CAP to allow an expansion of EU membership and to
meet the needs of future WTO rounds. However, EU membership and the completion of
the Single Market, by providing the platform for the construction of a modern economy,
have been much more important than the transfers Ireland has received. Access to new
markets in Central Europe will provide new opportunities.
• The consistency with which industrial policy has been pursued over the last 40 years is
now bearing fruit. However, it must be remembered that Scotland got 100 good years out
of shipbuilding and Northern Ireland got 100 good years out of linen. One can not expect
the current high technology industries, which have been so important for Ireland’s
success, to survive as long. Thus it is important not to overemphasise one or two sectors.
This need to maintain balance in economic success may prove difficult to achieve. The
role of the education system should remain that of preparing citizens for a lifetime that
will see them work in a number of different jobs and a number of different sectors.
• Finally, for two centuries the Irish have sought access, and got it, to the best labour
markets in the world. Changing circumstances may now see Ireland appearing as just such
a labour market to many in the rest of Europe and elsewhere. The need to approach this
issue with generosity and to ensure that future population movement brings cultural
stimulation rather than social tension is another challenge for the new century.
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4.2. Lessons for the Periphery
Ireland achieved its independence in 1922 on foot of a Sinn Féin - ourselves alone15 -
programme. The relative failure of that strategy, especially in the post-war years, contributed
to the depression of the 1950s, which permeated Irish society. The success of to-day owes
much to the enthusiasm with which Ireland has subsequently approached the globalisation of
its economy and the opening up of its society to outside influences. In viewing EU
membership as essentially liberating it has created a positive outward looking attitude which
affects business, the educational system, and politics. In the past there was concern that
Ireland might lose its identity either within the English speaking world, or more recently
within the EU. Such concerns are much less frequently expressed as a new self-confidence
takes over.
• It is this cultural change which is probably the single most important factor underlying the
current Irish economic renaissance. The factors which brought it about are clearly very
specific to Irish society and they do not translate to other countries or regions. However,
the importance of the process embracing the outside world probably does have relevance
for other Central European nations.
• A second feature of the Irish experience is the importance of following a consistent
strategy over a long period of time. The broad social and political consensus behind the
industrial and educational policies followed over the last 30 years has ensured a high level
of continuity. This is one aspect of Ireland’s experience which it is important  to stress
when considering the future for countries aspiring to EU membership. Ireland’s current
success is built on investment over 30 to 40 years and also on the pain of a major
restructuring of the economy in the 1980s. There is no quick fix for problems of
underdevelopment, though there is every reason to believe that the process can be
accomplished more efficiently, with less pain and in a shorter time than has been the Irish
experience.
• The centrality of investment in education to the process of economic growth does have
relevance for other countries. The changing nature of the world economy appears to be
favouring those with very high levels of education over the least educated and those
regions of Europe which ride the crest of this wave may reap the major benefits. Over the
                                                     
15 The literal English translation of Sinn Fein is “ourselves alone”.
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last 30 years the strength of the economies of countries such as that of Germany and the
Netherlands owes much to this factor.
• In the case of industrial policy, pursued consistently over 40 years, there have been
failures as well as successes. The concentration on tax incentives has probably in the past
unduly favoured foreign firms over domestic firms. The policy, begun in the late 1970s, of
targeting particular sectors also carried significant risks. However, we are now seeing the
benefits of critical mass in certain key sectors where the investment has succeeded. The
presence of a very active labour market in people with information technology skills
makes it possible to attract more and more investment in this area. A second aspect of
industrial policy has been its focus on sectors which are in the ascendant and the very
limited attention given to attracting investment or protecting existing firms in what are
essentially declining sectors - don’t throw good money after bad.
• Ireland has had two advantages which may not be available to all peripheral regions - the
English language and the existence of a core of employment in sophisticated services
sectors which are in the ascendant internationally and which require skilled labour. In the
case of the English language all Irish people find that travelling abroad it is a great
advantage to speak English but not to be English or American! It is no accident that the
information technology (IT) sector, which is dominated by the English language, has been
a sector in which Ireland has done well. In the case of tradable services, Ireland has the
advantage of having a core of employment in sophisticated legal services and the financial
sector. Being a separate country, albeit small, confers certain advantages in this regard
over regions of larger countries.16 It has provided a foot-hold in an area of economic
activity which is growing rapidly internationally.
In considering the lessons to be drawn from the Irish experience what strikes one is the
importance of opening up to the world economy, with free movement in goods, firms (foreign
direct investment), and people playing an important role in transforming the economy and
society generally. Diversity of experience and culture within the country can be a positive
advantage. In the case of Ireland, past failures and current successes owe something to
changing attitudes to investment in education. Finally, consistency in industrial policy over
long periods, consistency which was only possible with some national consensus, has played
an important role in its success.
                                                     
16 It also has additional costs as there are definitely increasing returns in the case of many of the
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It is clear that an important ingredient of the current Irish success story is luck. In so far as
countries make their own successes each country has to find its own path. It is this diversity
of experience which is both a stimulus and a challenge.
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